The complexity of any logical modeling re ects both the intrinsic structure of a topic described and the weight of the formal tools. Some of this weight seems inherent in even the most basic logical systems. Notably, standard predicate logic is undecidable. In this paper, we investigate`lighter' versions of this general purpose tool, by modally`deconstructing' the usual semantics, and locating implicit choice points in its set up. The rst part sets out the interest of this program and the modal techniques employed, while the second part provides technical elaborations demonstrating its viability.
The modal core of predicate logic
The well-known standard semantics for predicate logic has the following key clause:
M; a j = 9x Tarsk's main innovation here was the use of assignments, which are essential in decomposing quanti ed statements, which leave free variables in their matrix. But much less than this is needed to give a compositional semantics for rst-order quanti cation. The abstract core pattern which would make the latter work is this:
M; a j = 9x i for some : R x and M; j = :
Here,`assignments' , become abstract states, and the concrete relation = x (which holds between and x d ) has become just any binary update relation R x . Evidently, this abstract pattern involves standard poly-modal models, of the form M = (S; fR)xg x2VAR ; I) where S is a set of`states', R x a binary relation for each variable x, and I a`valuation' or`interpretation function' giving a truth value to each atomic formula Px, Rxy,... in each state . In particular, existential quanti ers 9x become unary existential modalities hxi. This modal state semantics for predicate logic has an independent dynamic appeal: rst-order evaluation is an informational process which changes computational states. The rst-order language then becomes a dynamic logic, with a special choice of atoms and without explicit compound programs.
From this modal point of view, conversely,`standard semantics' arises by insisting on three additional mathematical choices, not enforced by the new core semantics.
260
Modal Foundations for Predicate Logic (1) States are identi ed with variable assignments, (2)`update' must be the speci c relation = x , and (3) all assignments in the function space D VAR must be available to evaluation. The former are issues of implementation, the latter is a strong existence assumption. (Actually, standard predicate logic can get by with only locally nite assignments { but even that is a strong existence requirement.) Henceforth, we shall regard these further`set-theoretic' choices as negotiable. This view lends further support to the abstract modal approach. E.g., it is often felt that the usual set-theoretic tricks making predicates sets of tuples should be orthogonal to the nature of logical validity. Finally, as an alternative to even assumptions (1), (2) , Hollenberg & Vermeulen 1994 present a dynamic semantics for predicate logic manipulating states involving variable stacks whose update relations R x di er considerably from the standard one.
The universal validities produced by a general modal semantics are well-known. One obtains a minimal poly-modal logic, whose principles consist of all classical Boolean propositional laws
Modal Distribution: 8x ( ! ) ! (8x ! 8x )
Modal Necessitation: if` , then`8x a de nition of 9x as :8x : .
A completeness theorem with respect to the above abstract models may be proved via the standard modal Henkin construction with maximally consistent sets for the states in S, and the relations R x de ned via:
This logic can be analyzed in a standard modal fashion (cf. Andr eka, van Benthem & N emeti 1995 for a modern treatment), yielding usual meta-properties such as Craig Interpolation or Los-Tarski Preservation. Moreover, it is decidable by standard modal techniques ( ltration, semantic tableaus). One can now usefully pursue standard rst-order model theory in tandem with its modal counterpart. For instance, consider modal bisimulations for these models, relating states having the same atomic behaviour, with zigzag conditions for the relations R x . Specialize these to standard Tarski models. The result is a notion of partial isomorphism between models, related but not equal to the standard one. (Essentially this analogy was observed in Fernando 1992.) Further analogies are elaborated in , De Rijke 1993 .
The modal perspective suggests a whole landscape below standard predicate logic, with a`minimal modal logic' at the base, and ascending up to`standard semantics' via successive frame constraints. This seems the proper habitat of`dynamic semantics' as currently explored in the logico-linguistic literature. In particular, this landscape contains decidable sublogics of predicate logic, sharing its desirable meta-properties. (The minimal modal base itself is an example.) Thus, the`undecidability of predicate logic' largely re ects mathematical accidents of its Tarskian modeling, in particular, encoding set-theoretic facts about function spaces D VAR { rather than the core logic of quanti cation and variable assignment. We shall explore the resulting view of rst-order semantics, drawing upon the work of many authors. In particular, we nd that, as with other` ne-structure landscapes' underneath standard logic (e.g., the categorial or substructural hierarchy: van Benthem 1991, Dosen & Schroeder-Heister 1993), there is a rich family of natural calculi in our original language, but also one 2. DEPENDENCY MODELS 261 of richer languages re ecting the broader more sensitive semantics. In particular, abstract core models support distinctions between various forms of quanti cation (`monadic' and`polyadic') that get collapsed in standard predicate logic.
Dependency models
In addition to our two choices so far, there are further natural inhabitants of the landscape between standard logic and its minimal modal core. For instance, one may retain the general implementation of Tarski semantics (the above (1), (2) ), while giving up its existence assumption (3) . The result is a`half-way house' where S is some family of assignments in the usual sense (not necessarily the full function space D VAR ), and the R x are the standard relations = x . For instance, with two variables fx; yg, a domain with objects f1; 2g supports 2 4 assignment sets. One is the standard model with all four maps from variables to objects. Another has just the two assignments f ; g with (x) = 1, (y) = 2 and (x) = 2, (y) = 1. First-order evaluation will then be over generalized Tarskian models (M; V ) having a range V of`available assignments' as an extra parameter. An existential quanti er 9x says that some x{modi cation of the current state exists inside V satisfying .
Assignment gaps' turn out re ect an interesting phenomenon. Intuitively, one often wants to model`dependencies' between variables: i.e., a situation where changes in value for one variable x may induce, or at least be correlated with, changes in denotation for another variable y. Examples include natural reasoning (Fine 1985) , probabilistic logic (van Lambalgen 1991) and plural anaphoric discourse (van den Berg 1995). This phenomenon cannot be modeled in standard Tarskian semantics, where we can change values for variables completely independently: Starting from any state , one can move to any x d . But in a model with assignment gaps, the only way to change values for x, starting from some assignment , may be by incurring a change in y too. An example is the above two-assignment model, where any shift in value for x produces a corresponding one for y. Thus, standard models rather become those`degenerate cases' where all dependencies between variables have been suppressed. This shows clearly in the standard validity of the quanti er exchange principle 9x9y $ 9y9x , which will become typically invalid on our generalized models. For instance, Alechina (1995) proposes a semantics where (stated in our current framework) the key evaluation clause becomes M; j = 9x i for some : R x;y and M; j = where y is some sequence of`relevant context variables' { which might consist, e.g., of the free variables in 9x . In this case, even Modal Distribution will fail. Along a di erent path, van den Berg 1995 makes assignment sets themselves into new states encoding dependencies, which can be modi ed in the dynamic process of evaluation.
3 What do rst-order axioms say?
The above three semantic levels have further ne-structure. This may be brought out in two ways. First, one can study natural mathematical constraints on modal frames or generalized assignment models, re ecting various aspects of`dependence'. But also, one can analyze possible validities expressible in our rst-order language. The Modal Foundations for Predicate Logic latter strategy involves modal frame correspondences. A modal formula expresses a relational constraint C on abstract state frames if:
C holds of (S; fR x g x2VAR ) i (S; fR x g x2VAR ; I); j = for all states and interpretation functions I.
Let us see, over the minimal modal logic, what is expressed by the laws of predicate logic. Usually, all rst-order validities are together in one big bag. But in our modal semantics, they come to express di erent requirements on states and accessibility, with a computational slant. For a concrete illustration, we use modal correspondence to`deconstruct' the axioms in the well-known text book Enderton 1972. (But any text book axiomatization would do, with a di erent cut of the cake.) Enderton`s list has all universal closures of Boolean propositional laws, plus the three quanti er axioms
provided that x do not occur free in (3) 8x ! t=x] provided that t be free for x in The system has one inference rule, Modus Ponens. From a modal perspective, the propositional part is base valid (both axioms and rule). The rst quanti er axiom is the base valid Modal Distribution. Moreover, universal closure of axioms is a technique which amounts to postulating a rule of Necessitation for universal quanti ers. Indeed, the rst part of the Enderton axiomatization by itself is a complete calculus for the minimal modal logic! It is tempting to see the Hand of Providence at work here. Now, let us analyze the other quanti er axioms. We start with the least conspicuous one. From our present perspective, it is immensely powerful.
The axiom ! 8x
We analyze this principle inductively, in a modi ed formulation with atoms and their negations,^; _; 9; 8. Our argument will be heuristic, determining the e ect of various instances of this principle independently. The rst instance is the atomic pair: (2.1) Py ! 8x Py :Py ! 8x :Py These principles say that truth values for atoms without the variable x are una ected by R x {transitions. For assignments, with predicate interpretation as usual, this is equivalent to the condition that R x imply = x . In our abstract semantics, however, (2.1) does not naturally translate into a frame correspondence. It rather suggests a restriction on the range of our abstract interpretation functions I. These must satisfy a Heredity Principle stating that if I( ; Py), then I( ; Py) for all states with R x . (Restrictions on valuations are known from Kripke semantics for intuitionistic logic.) Pure frame conditions do emerge with compound cases of axiom (2). There is no new information to be extracted here. Suppose, inductively, that we already know that` 1 ! 8x 1 and` 2 ! 8x 2 . Then, in the base logic, we have automatically (using Distribution) that`( 1^ 2 ) ! 8x ( 1^ 2 ). The case for disjunction is entirely analogous. The real impact is in the quanti ed cases. Here we must distinguish two subcases. One may also use general facts about predicate logic to suggest natural constraints on dependency models. E.g., the Finiteness Lemma says that evaluation of formulas only depends on values for their free variables. This is no longer true in generalized assignment models, where free variables may carry implicit dependencies. But one can study Finiteness as an interesting condition per se. Such conditions may be on models rather than frames. Westerstahl 1995 redoes the above correspondence analysis on modal frames with heredity restrictions on admissible valuations. Next, we must analyze Enderton`s last quanti er axiom, stating that \8x ! t=x] , provided that t be free for x in " . In the spirit of our analysis so far, it is natural to view the substitution operator t=x] as a semantic update instruction in its own right. It will denote`controlled value assignment' x := t, which is the natural semantic companion to our`random assignment' for the existential quanti er 9x.
Quanti ers and substitutions
There is a folklore idea in dynamic logic that syntactic substitutions t=x] work semantically as program instructions x := t. 
Abstract assignment frames
We enrich the previous models by adding abstract relations A x;y , whose concrete interpretation in standard models is as follows: A x;y i (x) = (y) and (z) = (z) for all z distinct from x. Henceforth, for convenience, we only consider substitutions of variables for variables. The outcome is similar to that for existential quanti ers. There is a universally valid minimal logic, on top of which further principles express special constraints on the relations via frame correspondences. (All principles involved have Sahlqvist forms.) Interestingly, the usual syntactic`de nition' of substitution acquires semantic import: The rst of these is universally valid in the minimal modal logic. The second is a well-known modal axiom, whose two halves together express that the relation A x;y is to be a function. For convenience, we make this assumption henceforth. More generally, here, we want a principle like the earlier quanti er axiom (2): z=x] $ whenever x does not occur freely in . The direction from right to left here uses the quanti er axiom (2) in combination with axiom (3) (whose remaining force is gauged below). For, if x does not occur freely in , then 8x follows, which again implies y=x] (since y is free for x in ). From left to right, we argue as follows. If x does not occur freely in , then we already have` ! 8x . In the minimal modal logic then` z=x] ! z=x]8x . Now, by an earlier principle, we have z=x]8x ! 8x . Then, with one S4-axiom, we have z=x]8x ! . Together, this yields what we need. Complete calculi for rst-order substitutions occur in N emeti 1985, Thompson 1981, and Venema 1993 .
Finally, we return to the analysis of the initial quanti er axiom (3), which read:
8x ! y=x] provided that y be free for x in . Its business now becomes merely to relate the two modalities x] and y=x] : A x;y is contained in R x The proviso is taken care of by the earlier principles for`cautious substitution'. This completes our semantic analysis of a complete axiomatic system for predicate logic. Its consists of all accumulated principles on expanded abstract assignment frames (S; fR x g x2VAR ; fA x;y g x;y2VAR ), plus some constraints on admissible valuations. Of (T-axiom) What comes out in general is the idea that the usual`predicate-logical validities' form a very diverse bunch, which can be layered in many ways, for di erent purposes.
Landscape of deductive strength
Let us summarize the main line so far. First-order predicate logic may be viewed as a dynamic logic for variable assignment, whose atomic processes shift values in registers x; y; z; ::: This view-point opens up a hierarchy of ne-structure underneath standard predicate logic. The latter system becomes the mere (undecidable) theory of a particular mathematical class of`rich assignment models' in this perspective. What we get in this way is a broad semantic landscape (as also found in Modal Logic or Arrow Logic, cf. van Benthem 1991), with a minimal modal system at the bottom, where various intermediate systems arise by imposing some, though not all of the usual requirements on assignments and their R x (and A x;y ) structure: What are natural landmarks in this area? We would like to nd logics (1) that are reasonably expressive, (2) that share the important meta-properties of predicate logic (such as Interpolation, E ective Axiomatizability, perhaps even`Gentzenizability') and (3) that might even improve on this, by being decidable. The minimal predicate logic satis es these three demands { but can we ascend in the above landscape and get more powerful logics with the same behaviour? Fortunately, this area is not totally unexplored. The existing body of research in Cylindric Algebra has already identi ed some very interesting intermediate systems (cf., e.g., Henkin-Monk-Tarski 1985, Andr eka 1991 , N emeti 1985 , Venema 1994 , Marx 1994 . N emeti 1993 contains a number of interesting calculi, including the so-called`non-commutative' version of cylindric algebra ( rst proposed in Thompson 1981) , which becomes decidable by giving up the quanti er interchange axioms for 9x 9y and 8x 8y. All this is much like the well-known lattice of modal logics (Bull & Segerberg 1984, Blok 1979).
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One attractive candidate in this landscape is the system CRS (N emeti 1993).
It may be described as the set of all predicate-logical validities that hold in those abstract state frames for quanti cation and substitution which satisfy all universal frame conditions true in standard assignment models. These obey all general logical properties of assignments, but they do not make any existential assumptions about the supply of available assignments. The former conditions seem more truly`logical', whereas the latter would be more`mathematical' or`set-theoretic' in character. (This distinction between universal and existential principles in logical modelling has been defended more generally: e.g., for modelling temporal logic in van Benthem 1983.) For instance, in the above correspondences, universal S5-type conditions emerged, but also existential ones for quanti er interchange principles. Later on, we shall analyze the purely universal kind in more detail, by a representation method turning abstract state frames into assignment frames. Indeed, CRS may also be described as the logic of all generalized assignment models (M; V), introduced in Section 2. Two important known facts about CRS are that it is decidable (N emeti) and non-nitely axiomatizable (Andr eka). Moreover, our representation method will show that it has a rst-order de nition by means of universal Horn clauses, from which one can derive Craig Interpolation (Marx 1994) . But on top of CRS, one may continue, and add axioms up to the cli s of complexity.
This landscape of dynamic predicate logic can be investigated model-theoretically using standard modal techniques (van Benthem 1985, Goldblatt 1987 , Venema 1992 and De Rijke 1993). In particular, as observed before, basic modal notions such as bisimulation' between abstract models generalize model-theoretic counterparts over standard assignment models. There can still be some interesting discrepancies here. E.g., bisimulation relates complete variable assignments, whereas its model-theoretic counterpart of`partial isomorphism' relates nite sequences of objects. This re ects another meta-property of standard rst-order logic: no variable has a special identity. In the present abstract semantics, this is no longer the preferred option. With possible dependencies present, variables do gain`individuality' (cf. van Lambalgen 1991, Meyer Viol 1994). Other relevant modal themes include axiomatization techniques and decision methods across this whole landscape (cf. Marx 1994, Mikulas 1995).
Remark 5.1 (Two rst-order languages) Do not confuse two uses of` rst-order languages' here! One lives at an object level, as the`dynamic modal language' of assignment change. Another is used at a meta-level, as our`working language' for stating frame conditions. In particular, one can be a modal minimalist at the object level, and a standard logician at the meta-level.
The general picture here is like in Arrow Logic , Venema 1994 , Marx & Plos 1994 , with the same semantic thrust. Eventually, we do not just want to re-analyze predicate logic, but rather explore the expressive capacity of this new semantics (and the logics supported by it) because of its intrinsic intuitive appeal.
Rethinking the language
The modal analogy suggests, in particular, that rst-order predicate logic re ects only part of the expressive resources of abstract state models. In fact, there is an obvious Modal Foundations for Predicate Logic rst-order (meta-)language over these models, whose variables run over states (once again: please do not confuse this with our central modal rst-order object language!). This is the language into which one`translates' poly-modal logic in the usual sense (van Benthem 1983), which contains many assertions without a modal counterpart.
One example is an unrestricted existential quanti er 9 over states. By contrast, modal object quanti ers 9x induce restricted state quanti ers, which are of the form 9 (R x ^. (The`modal fragment' of the full rst-order state language is precisely determined by such quanti er patterns, which induce invariance for bisimulations. Up-to-date technical details are found in Andr eka, N emeti & van Benthem 1995.) 'Random assignment jumps`seem a natural meaning for isolated quanti er symbols 9 not tagged by any variable. Likewise, one might consider global predicates of states, not reducible to assertions about their object values at some nite set of variables. All this is just one instance of a broad theme mentioned at the beginning. A more general semantics below standard predicate logic usually suggests new notions, that were invisible in the`classical system'. We list a few directions for such extensions.
Stronger modalities
Add modal operators, such as the \universal modality", or more complex ones about internal structure of state transitions (\since", \until").
Dynamic operators
Add program constructions, starting from individual variables as atomic programs. E.g., the Path Principles suggest addition of both sequential composition and conjunctive intersection. Propositional dynamic logic with these two operations is still decidable: and hence so is our minimal base logic.
Polyadic quanti ers
A most interesting extension in expressive power is that to polyadic quanti ers. In standard predicate logic, a tuple notation 9 xy is just shorthand for either 9x 9y or 9y 9x . But here, it becomes a notion sui generis. On generalized assignment models, 9xy says that there exists some assignment agreeing with the current one up to fx; yg values where holds. The corresponding transitions encode a form of concurrency vis-a-vis the single transition relations R x and R y . This is not reducible to either iterated version, which require the existence of`intermediate states'. More generally, abstract state models admit natural de nitions of quanti ers 9x 1 :::x k stating the existence of some R hx1;:::;xki {accessible state where holds. In standard logic, this assertion is equivalent to any of its linearized versions 9x 1 :::9x k . But with possible`gaps' in our models, it is not so reducible. Polyadic quanti cation has linguistic interest (cf. Keenan & Westerstahl 1994) , and it comes into its own here. Thus, in formalizing natural reasoning, one may now treat sequences of variables as either`dependent' or`independent'. Moreover, adding the latter expressive resource leaves the basic predicate logic CRS decidable (cf. Mikulas 1995) . There is a more general issue, of course, as to how adding vocabulary a ects meta-properties of a logic in our landscape. Adding too much expressive power might reinstate standard 7. APPLICATIONS AND REPERCUSSIONS 269 rst-order logic. (Marx 1995 , Mikulas 1995 provide some case studies manipulating expressive power of vocabulary in`Arrow Logic'.) Polyadic language extensions also make sense in the presence of explicit substitutions. For instance, the latter needs both sequential composition and`concurrent conjunction' (to deal with irreducibly polyadic multiple substitutions of the form t 1 =x 1 ; :::; t k =x k ]).
Our style of analysis extends to other semantic parameters. E.g., not just assignments can change in Tarski semantics, but also interpretation functions (van Benthem & Cepparello 1994, Cepparello 1995). A modest, but natural extension arises as follows.
Partial-state frames
One new modeling proposed in dynamic semantics (Beaver 1994 , van den Berg 1991, Vermeulen 1994) employs partial assignments. These account for the intuitive di erence between`re-assignment' R x , changing an old value for x, and`new assignment' R + x , giving x a value for the rst time. These actions have corresponding rst-order quanti ers 9x and 9 + x, respectively. In partial-state frames, R x will remain transitive and Euclidean, but not re exive ( x-values are not always de ned). We only have the weaker principle 9x T^ ! 9x . By contrast, R 
Applications and repercussions
The present perspective suggests a number of applications. In particular, how much of standard predicate logic is involved in natural language, common sense reasoning, or mathematical proof? E.g., can the present decidable subcalculi of predicate logic supply a`natural logic' here? (Cf. Sanchez Valencia 1991, whose key principles of monotonicity and conservativity are derivable in weak calculi in our landscape.) Also, are there useful decidable systems of arithmetic or other parts of mathematics using these ideas? E.g., what is the theory of the natural numbers with all possible families of variable assignments? Perhaps, the usual predicate-logical base for applied theories is too strong for its purpose (cf. van Benthem 1993A). Other practical aspects concern the`distance' between standard and generalized models for the rst-order language.
It is known that CRS has the Finite Model Property (cf. Andr eka, van Benthem & N emeti 1994). Thus, well-known formulas whose standard satisfaction enforces in nity must have nite generalized models. Do the latter have any practical uses?
The thrust of our modal program can also be extended. It does not just apply to the dynamics of changing variable assignments, but also to updating information states. Abstract models can carry further structure, such as`composition' of states, which supports new dynamic connectives (van Benthem 1991, Kurtonina 1994). Similar Modal Foundations for Predicate Logic issues to those discussed here will arise then, now a ecting also the propositional base of rst-order predicate logic { which remained inviolate in our analysis so far.
By way of conclusion, here is what we take to be the philosophical importance of this work. If our abstract models are indeed the natural semantics for rst-order predicate logic, rather than a technical device, many received views of the eld are challenged.
In standard text books,`predicate-logical validity' is one unique notion, speci ed de nitively by Tarski, and justi ed by G odel's Completeness Theorem. Moreover, it is complex, being undecidable by Church's Theorem: Leibniz's ideal of a`Calculus Ratiocinator' just will not work. On the present view, however,`standard predicate logic' has arisen historically from several semantic decisions that could have gone di erently. The genuine logical core of rst-order predicate reasoning may well be decidable { and the real interest lies not in one unique`completeness theorem', but in the combined model-theoretic and proof-theoretic analysis of a rich family of options.
The remainder of this paper is a more technical exploration of the above framework (especially, CRS) with techniques from modal logic. These give a feel for how it reallỳ works'. Issues covered include (i) representation of abstract modal state frames in terms of concrete (generalized) Tarskian assignment models, (ii) decidability of logics over such generalized semantics via ltration and unraveling, (iii) weak and strong interpolation properties for weak predicate logics, (iv) extended languages for substitutions, (v) e ective translations between varieties of dependency semantics, and (vi) generalized generalized semantics' employing updates on assignment sets.
Representation
A systematic semantic view analyzes what it takes to represent any abstract modal frame as a family of assignments with the standard variable update relation = x . The following proposal is very simple, and probably equivalent to some algebraic method. How can abstract states become assignments? The obvious idea is to create`objects' ( ; x) for each state and variable x, and then set This stipulation will indeed turn states into assignments, and represent abstract state frames as assignments frames with arbitrary abstract update relations R x . (Thus, the latter option is not really di erent from the most general one.) But if the latter relations are to become the standard updates = x , then some re nement is necessary.
Representing state frames
For a start, we assume all universal properties of standard assignment frames. What is needed on the way will eventually be collected in the statement of our results. Let Z denote some sequence of variables. Extend the notion of accessibility as follows: Here is a special case. With only two variables, the latter information applied to the variable y says that ; are related via some nite sequence (possibly empty) of R x -steps. Using only re exivity and transitivity, then, we get the desired conclusion. Thus, we have found (as more often in the algebraic literature) that the two-variable fragment of predicate logic is particularly simple: Proposition 8.1 With only two variables, an abstract state frame is representable as an assignment frame i its relations R x are equivalence relations.
The general situation is more complex. E.g., with three variables, we may have:
x z y x Z y = hx; zi Z z = hy; xi In the standard assignment model, this implies that ; agree on both y and z, whence the arrows for y and z must be identity transitions, and we have R x . More generally, all Path Principles of the following form are valid under the standard Tarskian interpretation (notice that there are in nitely many of these):
If R Z1 ; :::; R Zk , and the only variable occurring in all of Z 1 ; :::; Z k is x, then R x . If no variable occurs in all connecting sequents, then = .
Proposition 8.2 An abstract frame is representable as an assignment frame i its relations R x are equivalence relations satisfying all Path Principles.
Modal Foundations for Predicate Logic
Proof. Continue the above argument. Suppose that 8y 6 = x9Z : y 6 2 Z^ R Z . Let y be any speci c variable distinct from x, and select a connecting path Z y . For any of the ( nitely many!) variables u occurring on this path distinct from x, select some connecting path Z u on which u fails to occur. Then x is the only variable in the intersection, and the path principle for Z y and the Z u 's will say that R x .
Three points may clarify this. (1) Transitivity for relations R x follows from the Path Principles. (2) Re exivity is needed when the intersection of all occurrence sets of variables on the paths is empty. (3) One should take care. For instance, the principles do not say that the two R y -transitions displayed must be identical ones:
Next, the second Path Principle also implies that our representation is one-to-one.
Fact 8.3
In the above case, the map from states to assignments is injective.
Proof. (We need at least two variables x; y.) Suppose that = . Then we have, in particular, that = x and = y . By the above observation, this implies that R x and R y . But then, by the second Path Principle, = .
Analyzing this simple representation from a logical point of view { especially, the crucial family of Path Principles { we see the following:
The class of representable abstract frames is de nable by a set of rst-order sentences which are all universal Horn. This de nition employs in nitely many frame conditions. The former property has pleasant consequences, including Interpolation for predicatelogical validity over this frame class (by general results in modal logic; Section 10). The second property hints at a certain complexity (cf. the non-nite axiomatizability result by Andr eka). Finally, it is easy to see that few Path Principles correspond to a modal formula in the predicate-logical language. This completes our analysis of CRS. Representing state models Our representation extends to models M that interpret structured atomic formulas. These are abstract frames (S; fR x g x2VAR ) plus an interpretation function I interpreting atoms over states (a`modal valuation'), needed to interpret the predicate-logical object language. De ne the following standard interpretation function over the represented frame (with one binary predicate letter Q, for convenience):
I (Q) = f(( ; x) ; ( ; y) ) j I( ; Qxy)g
We need to show the following assertion of adequacy:
Claim 8.5 M; j = i M ; j = , for all predicate-logical .
Unfortunately, we do not quite succeed. The following is as far as we get.
Proof. Attempt] The assertion is automatic for Booleans, and it holds for quantiers by the above proof. The atomic case presents a di culty, though. From left to right, its assertion is trivial. If M; j = Qxy, then I( ; Qxy) holds, and hence I (Q) holds of ( ; x) ; ( ; y) (i.e., (x); (y)) by de nition. From right to left, however, we encounter an obstacle. Let I (Q) hold in M of (x), (y), that is, of ( ; x) ; ( ; y) . Thus, there exists with ( ; x) ( ; x), ( ; y) ( ; y) such that I( ; Qxy). By the de nition of , then, there exist two nite sequences Z x (not containing x) and Z y (not containing y) with R Zx , R Zy . Now, what we need to show is that I( ; Qxy). Here, evidently, the earlier atomic invariance principles Py ! 8x Py and :Py ! 8x :Py should help. But these are not strong enough. We need a more complex path principle stating that Qxy ! Z x \Z y ]Qxy. This is beyond our modal predicate-logical language, however { as it involves what is essentially a further operation of`program intersection'. One way of overcoming this di culty uses an extension of our representation to a richer predicate-logical language. Two options are presented in digressions below. Westersthl 1995 presents the most elegant solution so far, combining our previous representation with ideas from Section 9 below. One can extend these representation arguments to abstract frames with transition relations A x;y re ecting the earlier substitution. We forego this extension here (Section 11 has some relevant details).
Option 1 Pointwise Equality of States
The following useful relation turns up implicitly in the above arguments:
This suggests the use of enriched state models (S; fR x g x2VAR ; fR x g x2VAR ; I). The new relations R x are easier to handle than the old R x , being equivalence relations. They can be used to de ne the latter, via the following equivalence: In what follows, we x some formula with variables VAR (free or bound) and subformulas SUB . Everything will be restricted to such nite syntax sets. First, we de ne a multi-S5 nite ltration over generalized assignment models. Filtration also works for generalized models with Locality (for all relevant formulas), to yield a nite model with that property. One makes two equivalence classes R z { accessible when they agree on all formulas in which variable z does not occur free.
Unwinding Kripke models
The above ( ltrated) Kripke models are abstract. They may lack some key properties of generalized assignment models. Notably, the earlier`Path Principles' may fail. (E.g., there may be two di erent links R x ; R y between two distinct states.) We can improve this behaviour by path unravelling, to get a basis for concrete representation.
De nition 9. Proof. The function sending X to last(X) is a bisimulation. The only non-routine fact here is that the map`last' is a homomorphism with respect to the relations R z in the unwinding. (This part of the argument will work as long as our frame conditions are universal Horn.) Now, one further observation may be made. Corollary 9.5 Formulas satis able in nite Kripke models are also satis able in nite unwound Kripke models.
Proof. This is the multi{S5 version of the well-known modal Finite Depth Lemma. Evaluating a formula from the root involves only nitely many alternations in depth across di erent relations R z { as may be seen through normal forms for multi-S5.
This`cut-o ' at the modal depth of preserves Atomic Locality (in its abstract Kripke version, as a constraint on the valuation V ) { though not necessarily full Locality. Finally, we note that unwound Kripke models do satisfy all Path Principles.
Representing unwound Kripke models Unwound multi{S5 models can be represented as generalized assignment models. (This is a more concrete version of the representation in Section 8.) The idea is easily explained. Take an arbitrary assignment (x i ; d i )(1 i k) of di erent objects Modal Foundations for Predicate Logic to the relevant variables at the root. Then, follow longer sequences X upward. If an assignment ass(X) has already been de ned, then choose a supply of new objects, and change values at z only for steps from X to X \ hz; wi. This is well-de ned. De nition 9.6 The object representation OBJ(M) of an unwound Kripke model M has just been described. Its admissible assignments are those produced in the process. We can now apply these results to obtain Theorem 9.8 Validity in generalized assignment semantics is decidable.
Proof. Combining the previous facts, a formula is satis able in a generalized assignment model i it has a nite abstract Kripke model satisfying Atomic Locality whose size is bounded by 2 jSUB j . The latter property is decidable.
Theorem 9.9 Generalized assignment semantics has the Finite Model Property.
Proof. By the above Cut-O Property, nite generalized models will su ce. In Andr eka, van Benthem & N emeti 1995, this reasoning is also applied to obtain decidability for large 'bounded fragments' of predicate logic over standard models. That paper investigates connections in the following heuristic equation: full predicate language : generalized dependency semantics = bounded quanti er fragments : standard semantics. This proof goes through for any modal logic whose characteristic frame class is de ned by universal Horn conditions, since these are preserved under submodels and direct products of frames. The essential model MN in the above argument is a submodel of a direct product. (It is a categorial`pull-back': cf. Marx 1995 for further category-theoretic background.) Note that this situation cannot be too common, since Interpolation is known to be scarce for modal logics (Maksimova 1979 To prove this stronger property, the above bisimulation can be merely assumed to satisfy zigzag clauses with respect to accessibility relations R i whose modalities hii With additional frame conditions, however, even universal Horn clause ones, matters may be much more complicated. For instance, the modal logic with axiom h1i ! h2i has weak interpolation, but it evidently lacks the strong version. With simple Horn clause conditions, the above proof may work. In particular, for modal multi{S5, where all R i are equivalence relations, the preceding construction works with two extra stipulations. In the original product part, one must add all links We sum up our results in the following Proof. In one direction, all S5{laws are clearly validated by the Path Principles. But also conversely, any model for multi-S5 can be unravelled to one which satis es all Path Principles for free. This requires careful unraveling by sequences to make sure that worlds share loops for all relations R i , while apart from that, all proper successor steps are to be unique for each such relation. More precisely, the new worlds become nite sequences of worlds h:::; w; i; v; :::i, whose immediate successor steps select some R i {successor v of w, marking this transition uniquely. Over these sequences, the new relation R i is de ned as the re exive, symmetric transitive closure of the set of all tuples (X; hX; i; yi). It follows that two sequences X; Y can only be related via some nite sequence of transitions (using possibly di erent indices) i Y can be reached from X by rst dropping successive X-tails, and then adding new tails. (There is a unique shortest link of this kind. Longer connections may arise by making excursions en route.) This observation implies the Path Principles for CRS. If there exists a route between X and Y in which a relation R i is missing, then the minimal connecting path does not involve R i . Repeating this for any given nite family of linkings, a pure minimal connection must exist for the remaining modality.
By this Fact, Strong Interpolation for CRS follows from that for multi-S5. When this representation is combined with the earlier one, over modal state frames (S; fR x g x2VAR ; fA x;y g x;y2VAR ), adjustments are needed for the other equivalence:
These involve several earlier modal interaction principles between substitutions and quanti ers. The functions A x;y are not very complex. For instance, in CRS, an 'existential principle' like y=x]9z $ 9z y=x] (modulo distinctness) can be treated quasi-universally (cf. Marx 1994) . On standard models, the principles of (1) contract nite sequences of substitutions to normal forms for standard simultaneous substitutions x := u (with all x i distinct, and no u i occurring among the x i ). As an illustration, take the Hoare-style assignment axiom for program correctness:
f t=x] gx := tf g
In our temporal logic, this is the basic conversion axiom (H: \has always been"):
One can also express standard identity statements using backward modalities:
The backward substitution modality combines identity and ordinary quanti cation:
With this additional expressive power, it would be of interest, even in standard predicate logic, to axiomatize a version of this back-and-forth substitution calculus. The substitution calculus may also be extended to deal with multiple substitutions, as was suggested for polyadic quanti ers in Sections 6, 8. The same points apply.
Translations
Modal languages may be translated into rst-order ones over standard state models. This re ects a broad perspective on dependency semantics relating di erent models and languages. Indeed, there are two main approaches towards 'taming' classical rst-order logic, localizing a decidable 'core'. One uses standard semantics over nonstandard 'bounded' language fragments, the other non-standard generalized semantics over the standard rst-order language. The former approach is more 'syntactical' in nature, the latter more 'semantical'. (Eventually, as so often in logic, this distinction is relative. For instance, one can also translate 'semantic' modal discourse about the above modal rst-order models into a restricted syntactic fragment of a two{sorted rst-order logic, with direct reference to both 'individuals' and 'states'. But also conversely,... etcetera.) There is a mathematical duality lurking in the background here, largely unexplored { which we illustrate by some simple observations from Andr eka, van Benthem & N emeti 1995, which involve one{sorted translations.
From bounded fragments to generalized models Consider any k{variable language Lfx 1 ; :::; x k g. Let R be a new k{ary predicate. We de ne a translation tr g from k{variable formulas to bounded rst-order ones: Global Relativization tr g ( ) arises from by relativizating all its quanti ers to the atom There is more to this analysis. Special classes of generalized assignment models arise by imposing constraints on admissible assignments. The rst-order theory of such classes, too, will be decidable, as long as their additional conditions can be stated into suitably bounded rst-order forms. In particular, this applies to so-called 'locally square' generalized assignment models, in which every permutation or identi cation of valuse in an admissible assignment yields another admissible assignment. (These are needed for the full substitution version of CRS.) So far, we know less about converse translations, running from bounded fragments to generalized semantics.
Translations help in comparing di erent models for dependency. Recall the analysis of generalized quanti ers in Section 2. The latter arises from rst-order logic through a 'local translation' tr l like the 'global translation' tr g , but with a delicate di erence. At subformulas 9x i , one only relativizes to an atom R x where x enumerates all free variables of the local context . This di erence explains all deviant behaviour. E.g., tr g makes Modal Distribution a valid bounded principle, whereas tr l does not: 8y (8x (Ax ! Bxy) ! (9x Ax ! 9x Bxy)) tr g R x y ! 8y (Rxy ! (8x (Rxy ! (Ax ! Bxy)) ! (9x (Rxy^Ax) ! 9x (Rxy^Bxy))) tr l 8y (Ry ! (8x (Rxy ! (Ax ! Bxy)) ! (9x (Rx^Ax) ! 9x (Rxy^Bxy))) 13 Higher dependency models Generalized assignment semantics can be taken further, for richer languages. We discuss a logical system inspired by the account of plurality in van den Berg 1995.
From singular to plural states
The semantic literature on collectives and plurals uses assignments mapping variables to sets of objects. Thus, states move up, from type (v ! e) to type (v ! (e ! t)). But in a next step, one can identify states with sets of standard assignments, in the type ((v ! e) ! t). This allows for ner discrimination, with possible dependencies between values for individual variables (needed to account for linguistic anaphora). In set-theoretic terms, from a repeated power (2 DOM ) VAR , we go to 2 (DOM VAR ) . Generally speaking, the latter will be much larger in size { which re ects our greater freedom for encoding dependencies between objects assigned. Thus, the above generalized assignment models re-emerge from a quite di erent angle. There are some natural connections between the two state domains. The following map sends plural assignments A to sets S(A) of individual assignments: S(A) = ff j for all x; f(x) is in A(x)g Another map sends sets S of individual assignments to plural assignments A(S):
A(S) = x ff(x) j all f in Sg: The map S delivers special`full' sets of assignments. It is 1{1, unlike the map A. The di erence between the two levels depends on the formal language interpreted over them. With a standard rst-order predicate logic for plurality, nothing changes. This is the import of the Equivalence Theorem in van den Berg 1995, for a language having new operators for`individualization' x and`participation' x . E.g., M; S j = x i for some set S 0 which consists of all functions in S set to one speci c individual value d for x; M; S 0 j = Richer logics of dependencỳ where formulas may involve new logical operators, exploiting the richer structure of collective states. We have at least two kinds of existential quanti cation now, re ecting two natural transition relations over states:
9 coll x is true at S i is true at some S 0 with S = x S 0 , i.e., S; S 0 have the same assignments up to values for the variable x 9 ind x is true at S i is true at some S 0 with S = x S 0 , i.e., S; S 0 have the same assignments but all x-values in S 0 are set to one object. The resulting modal logic encodes a theory of interaction between individual and collective quanti cation. It can be explored via modal frame correspondences, with axioms re ecting structural properties of and connections between the above two types of accessibility relation, say, R coll ; x and R ind ; x (for all variables x).
evaluating rst-order formulas. Alechina & van Benthem 1993 put this into a more general form with 'structured domains', without probabilistic concerns { but with some technical complications (due to their use of sequences of individuals, rather than assignments, as the states). Alechina 1995 is a sustained study of dependency models, comparing state-basedand object-basedviews of dependence. Algebraic logic Technically, our proposals involve the generalized semantics for predicate logic proposed by Andr eka & N emeti, on the basis of their earlier work in cylindric algebra (see their beautiful lectures at the conference \Logic at Work"; Marx & P olos 1995). What we consider here are essentially`atom structures' in cylindric algebra, viewed from a modal perspective. This perspective has been developed in depth and applied quite extensively in the dissertation Venema 1992 on multimodal logic, whose`cylindric modal algebra' is our technical paradigm here (cf. Marx & Venema 1995) .
What we have to add to all this is a more radical intrinsic motivation, as well as the thesis that it is the landscape of new options itself that is of intrinsic value. It needs to be developed { rather than just serve to provide side-lights on an unchallenged orthodoxy. In the course of this story, we also found a number of new technical results, showing the viability and interest of this kind of semantic analysis.
